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 真是人心不蛊啊！把个事搞得像雍正继位之谜一样······文章作者被国内某媒体评为未来影响中国经济的 |
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自由原子弹
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[个人文集]
游客
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作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
左猜右猜，上猜下猜，还有呼天抢地的，洗刷清白的，知道啥叫越描越黑吗？好好的坛子，想干啥？搁其他地，早喀嚓一声，您闭嘴吧，宁可出白版，开天窗，也不让您嚷嚷。以前没理搅三分，得理不饶人，现在好象变啦，没理不饶人了。
TNND,这好象是安校长以前教表妹的骂法，那丫头本来就是个淘气鬼，您还不教她学好。
想干正事的把精神集中到正事上。谢国忠（摩根士丹利亚洲首席经济学家）的分析报告，给在基金公司或投资银行的朋友参考参考。10月初的，忘贴了。都是那帮人吵吵的。该同志被某杂志评为未来影响中国经济发展的十大精英之一。
在北京的同志，28日在嘉里中心有一重要国际金融会议，没事去瞧瞧，肯定有门卫，您就自己混进去吧。
表妹，我中午在嘉里18层的酒廊看见的不是你吧？要不就是你表哥眼花了。
Slowdown Impact: Minerals vs. Metals
*****Mineral imports will likely normalize to trend growth rates
As the property sector decelerates and grows in line with GDP in the future, the growth rates of mineral imports should also normalize. The trend growth rate for iron ore imports is 14% compared to 34% this year and 21% last year. Also, cyclical factors may keep imports below trend for one or two years.
*****Imports of metals may decline for two years
China has increased production capacity in line with or above demand growth. When demand slows down, imports tend to give up first, as domestic prices fall more than international prices.
*****The lag between credit deceleration and commodity prices could be three months
Investment, funded by bank loans, fuel China's commodity demand. As credit slows, demand will follow. The lag could be three months. We may see commodity prices softening in January 2004.
Summary and Investment Conclusion
---------------------------------
China's imports of industrial commodities have doubled or tripled in past five years, in line with the growth rates of its property, infrastructure and automobile sectors. China is cooling its property sector; its growth rate would likely be in line with GDP. Infrastructure investment is already growing in line with GDP. The Automobile sector can likely continue to grow its volume at 30% per annum for another three years.
China's demand for minerals and metals would likely decelerate sharply with property sector deceleration. Steel demand, for example, is up by 22.6% this year and by 13.1% per annum on average since 1998 versus 7.5% in the past decade. The growth rate of steel was merely 2.2% during 1993-98 after the previous investment cycle peaked. It is quite likely that China's steel demand growth rate will stay in single-digit for the next three years.
The volume impact will likely be similar across the value chain; however, the pricing impact would be much greater downstream than upper stream, as China's capacity in downstream activities is much greater than upper stream. When the cycle turns down, domestic prices tend to decline more than offshore prices.
I firmly believe that Chinese demand for natural resources would grow strongly in the long term. However, cycle could exaggerate its growth rate as now and there could be a payback in the form of below trend growth rate for one or two years. Further, China's impact on downstream activities is usually deflationary, which would come when cycle turns down.
Mineral Imports: Reverting to Normal Growth Rates
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China's imports of minerals and other natural resources have skyrocketed in recent years. China's iron ore imports, for example, have nearly tripled. The main source of demand first came from infrastructure stimulus during the Asian Financial Crisis, and then from property after China introduced mortgages and began to monetize state land.
Because China has exhausted its domestic production of minerals, the extra demand for metals has to be met either by direct import or minerals for domestic processing. Thus, Chinese demand has a leveraged effect on global minerals trade. It is reasonable to believe that China's imports would grow faster in future than in the past, on average.
However, the growth in the past two years has been exaggerated by China's property quantity bubble. The introduction of mortgages laid the foundation for monetizing state land. It created a massive source of revenue for cash-starved local governments. Further, it also made it possible for well-connected businessmen to leverage their relationships to obtain land at below-market price, which allows them to borrow to fund their projects with debt only.
A large number of well-connected businessmen rushed in to take advantage of their political connections, when state land became liquid. Local governments shared in the revenue from monetizing land value. At the beginning of 2002, Chinese banks found the perfect excuse to increase loans - the leadership transition between 3Q03 and 1Q04. Loan growth took off at a multiple speed of the GDP growth rate (see, Sharp Slowdown Ahead, October 20, 2003). That triggered the enormous increase in demand for construction materials, which led to massive capacity formation in such industries, of course, funded by more bank loans. Their multiplier effect on the labor market boosted demand for property and the cycle spiraled up steeply.
Exhibit 1
Minerals vs. Metals
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(ton mn) 1993 1998 2001 2002 2003E
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Minerals Imports
Iron ore 32.9 52.0 92.4 111.5 149.4
Magnesium 0.6 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.9
Copper ore 0.2 1.2 2.3 2.1 2.9
Chromium ore 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.2 2.1
Aluminium oxide 1.0 1.6 3.4 4.6 5.8
Metals Imports
Steel 33.5 12.4 17.2 24.5 36.2
Aluminium 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.4
Copper incl. scrap 0.6 1.8 5.0 5.3 4.9
Oil Imports
Crude 15.7 26.8 60.2 69.4 90.1
Refined products 17.4 21.6 21.4 20.4 31.4
Domestic Production
Steel 89 124 152 182 217
Aluminium 2.3 2.7 3.6
Iron ore 225 197 218 230 250
Crude 132 165 210 219 241
Refined products 103 113 145 150 164
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Source: CEIC
Note: 2003 estimates are extrapolations of first eight months' data
The strong property market triggered capital inflow, which increased the pressure on the Renminbi to appreciate. The talk of currency appreciation encouraged more investors to put money into China, which boosted the property market further. Of course, when the property market finally cools under credit tightening or rising vacancy rates, the process reverses. Those who believe that Renminbi should appreciate may then move to the opposite side and start talking about the possibility of Renminbi depreciation. Balance of payment surplus in a developing country is usually a result of a bubble mentality among investors. It is incorrect to say, in my view, that a country could continue to grow faster because it is still seeing capital surplus.
Total steel demand has risen at 7.9% per annum on average in the past 10 years. If this speed is maintained over the next 10 years and domestic iron ore production continues to grow at the same pace of 1% per annum, iron imports should grow at 14% per annum in volume over the next 10 years.
The trend growth rate is obviously much lower than 34% this year and 21% last year in iron ore imports. Further, the cyclical factor could depress mineral imports to below trend for one or two years.
Downstream Activities Suffer More Deflation
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China has a capital surplus. Its production tends to move up the value chain in every cycle. When the cycle turns, domestic production capacity covers more demand proportionally than before. Thus, imports of finished products become more sensitive to China's cycle on the way down.
For example, China imported 33.5 million tons of steel in 1993 - the peak of the last investment cycle. It collapsed by one third in 1994 and another one third in 1995. The steel imports climbed back above the 1993 level only this year. During the same period, iron ore imports rose by 354%. This shows how upstream and downstream imports could be affected so differently by China's cycle.
An important factor in this story is that China continues to re-price the value-added component in every industry that it moves into. For example, the value added in steel production is likely to be re-priced as the cycle turns down, because private producers have learned to produce steel at 20-30% less cost than the prevailing level in other countries. They will likely continue to expand into the down cycle, which would push other producers out of business over time.
Aluminum could well repeat what happened to steel in the last cycle, in my personal opinion. Domestic production and imports have increased by 56% and 57% in the past two years, respectively. The domestic capacity is probably increasing at a faster speed. When demand slows next year, imports would likely be affected first, as domestic prices fall more than offshore prices.
The Lag Between Credit and Demand
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The ultimate test for investment cooling is when commodity prices begin to decline. We have not seen that yet. However, as Chinese capex demand is all funded by banks, credit deceleration will affect commodity prices with a lag. There are insufficient data to estimate the lag. My guesstimate is three months.
Credit cooling measures were announced in August. Many well-connected businessmen rushed to get loans before the door shut tight. Thus, loan growth bubbled up after the tightening policy was announced. It appears that liquidity has tightened much more this month. I believe metal prices may begin to decline significantly in January 2004.
Andy Xie (Hong Kong)
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作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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 真是人心不蛊啊！把个事搞得像雍正继位之谜一样······文章作者被国内某媒体评为未来影响中国经济的 -- 自由原子弹 - (19916 Byte) 2003-10-26 周日, 12:27 (1215 reads)
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