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yingsu
加入时间: 2006/05/14
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作者：yingsu 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
U.S. antidumping policy toward China
Introduction
The U.S.-China trade relationship has evolved rapidly into one of the world’s most consequential. Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001, two-way trade has increased by 91 percent to a whopping $231 billion in 2004－a growth rate more than six times greater than that between the United States and the rest of the world.
Behind these figures are billions of dollars of international investment; thousands of joint production operations; technology-sharing arrangements; intricate transnational supply chains; and burgeoning business relationships that benefit workers, consumers, and investors in both countries, as well as in others. Meanwhile, there are important geopolitical objectives advanced by this developing relationship. An ever-increasing number of economic and strategic interests is vested in the harmony of trade relations between the United States and China.
The Bush administration seems to recognize this reality, and has thus far been a fairly adept steward of the relationship. It shepherded the final phase of China’s accession into the WTO. It had the wherewithal to reject calls for import restraints in response to alleged currency manipulation and unfair labor practices. It deemed contrary to the U.S. economic interest and thus rejected tariffs prescribed by the U.S. International Trade Commission in three China-specific safeguard cases.1 And it success-fully negotiated resolution to an issue regarding a Chinese semiconductor tax that discriminated against U.S. producers without requiring for-mal WTO adjudication.
But there have been some notable exceptions to this otherwise forward-looking strategy. Chief among them is arguably the administration’s position on antidumping policy toward China. In stark contrast to its broader restraint in the face of anti-China protectionist pressure, the Bush administration has adopted an unabashedly bellicose approach to anti-dumping matters.
The U.S. Department of Commerce, the agency that administers the antidumping law, seems to regard blocking Chinese imports as a measure of its success. An area of its website that touts trade achievements boasts that “the Commerce Department has already put in place nearly as many antidumping orders against China (21) as the previous Administration had in eight years (25),” and that “the Commerce Department initiated the largest cases against China ever on imports of TVs, furniture and shrimp, valued at over $1.5 billion.”2 Since January 2001, the first month of the Bush administration, there have been 32 antidumping investigations launched against China. That is almost triple the number of investigations against the next most frequent target during this period, India (12), and amounts to one new investigation every 45 days.
Although the White House has little discretion to intervene and block the imposition of antidumping duties－which it has in safe-guards cases－it absolutely holds sway over the policy direction of the DOC. The administration should take a hard look at its antidumping policy toward China, particularly the DOC’s absurd nonmarket economy (NME) methodology, as well as some dubious rules changes that the agency is considering. An honest assessment will lead to the conclusion that U.S. antidumping policy is undermining the other-wise laudable efforts of the administration to keep the U.S.-China trade relationship on sound footing.
Antidumping’s Fatal Flaw
The U.S. antidumping law is one of the most contentious features of American trade policy. Defended as a tool necessary to redress unfair trade and to “level the playing field,” the reality is that the law, as administered, is incapable of distinguishing between unfair and fair trade. As a result, normal, unobjectionable, international trade, and the foreign and U.S. companies involved, are punished unjustly on a routine basis.
Under the law, evidence of price discrimi-nation or selling at prices below the full cost ofproduction－often perfectly rational, profit-maximizing, and legal pricing strategies－is considered proof of the existence of some unfair competitive advantage. Yet, there is no mechanism by which to distinguish price dif-ferences attributable to an unfair advantage from those attributable to legitimate strategies. That absence of analytic rigor virtually guaran-tees innocent victims, when the authorities should be applying antidumping rules with precision to avoid or at least minimize such collateral damage.
In previous research, Cato Institute scholars have documented in detail just how divorced the antidumping law and its administration is from any theoretical justification for its existence.3 That research also identified numerous procedures undertaken by the administering authorities that reflect an inherent bias in favor of finding affirmative evidence of dumping.4 In hopes of remedying these problems, Cato scholars proposed a number of reforms designed to narrow the gap between antidumping rhetoric and reality, to remove the methodological bias, and to minimize the collateral damage that should be unacceptable to any fair-minded observer.5 Nowhere is this lack of precision and disregard for any semblance of due process more evident than where it concerns so-called nonmarket economy methodology.
Nonmarket Economy Methodology
The DOC employs NME methodology in antidumping cases against a few countries, but China is by far its largest victim.6 The general presumption implicit in NME methodology is that in centrally planned economies, prices are unreliable because nonmarket forces intervene to influence supply-and-demand decisions. Thus, prices do not reflect true supply and demand and should be considered an inadequate benchmark in measuring price discrimination or selling below cost.
Despite the dramatic market-oriented reforms instituted in China over the past quarter century, China’s WTO accession protocol allows members to use an antidumping “methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that product.”7
That exemption, which allows WTO members to treat China as an NME, expires in 2016. However, members can graduate China as a whole, or any of its industries individually, to market economy status anytime before then. While the DOC has formal standards and procedures by which it can designate Chinese industries as “market-oriented industries,” it has never done so despite compelling evidence in some cases that it should.
Designating industries as “market oriented” or graduating countries from NME to market economy status is purely a matter of administrative discretion. Neither statutory changes nor judicial review is required. Thus, the Bush administration could exercise its discretion to graduate China to market economy status at any time, as it did for Russia and Kazakhstan in 2002 and Lithuania and Estonia in 2003.
In NME cases the DOC attempts to estimate what prices would be if the country’s economy were market based. It does so by determining the quantity of inputs (e.g., labor, electricity, materials) required to produce the subject product and then valuing those inputs using wage rates, usage rates, and prices of material inputs prevailing in some third country. It then combs the financial statements of select third-country companies, culling figures to serve as approximations for selling, general, and administrative expenses, as well as profit rates. These figures are consolidated with all the other constituent cost components to pro-duce an estimated normal value, which serves as the benchmark to which U.S. price is com-pared. Thus, affirmative dumping findings do not reflect price discrimination or selling below cost, but rather differences between an exporter’s price in the U.S. market and a fictitious hodgepodge of estimated components serving as a proxy for his home market price.
Rampant Discretion
The outcome in NME cases is dictated by aseries of subjective decisions: the selection ofthe surrogate country and the selection of sur-rogatevalues. Each party to the proceedingpursues a results-oriented argument: petition-ersseek selection of the least efficient produc-ersand the highest input valuations, whilerespondents advocate selection of the mostefficient producers and the lowest input valua-tions.Meanwhile, the DOC adjudicates eachpoint of contention throughout the process,seemingly unfazed by the farcical nature of theprocess.
In the recent high-profile case concerningWooden Bedroom Furniture from China, themandatory respondents reported “anywherefrom 60 to upwards of 100 factors of productionwhich required the Department to evaluate andobtain values for over 500 company-specific fac-torsof production.”8 These factors were valuedusing Chinese purchase prices for those inputsthat were sourced from a market economy, andIndian import prices for those inputs that wereproduced in China, unless such information wasfound unreliable or otherwise unusable. Onesuch component for which usable Indian datawere unavailable was－of all things－wood, anobviously important input for wooden furniture.Thus, Russian import prices served as the basisfor valuing this input.
For its final determination in the furniturecase, the DOC published a 373-page “Issuesand Decisions” memorandum summarizingthe voluminous arguments made by interestedparties, and offering an explanation for theDOC’s position on each. Much of the docu-mentis devoted to adjudicating positions con-cerningthe appropriate surrogate values to usefor items such as mirrors, glass, screws, handles,hinges, hooks, tape, styrofoam, particle board,cardboard, packing material, selling expenses,and profit.
In its memorandum, the DOC reports:“This investigation has presented a host of com-plexissues with respect to HTS [HarmonizedTariff Schedule] categories and factor valua-tions, given the hundreds of inputs that are nec-essaryto produce the subject merchandise. It isimportant to recognize that the breadth of theinformation we have requested in this investiga-tionis substantial. We have balanced that recog-nitionwith the importance of ensuring that theinformation we receive is adequate for purposesof calculating an accurate antidumping margin.”9
Fidelity to accuracy is not a hallmark ofNME methodology. For most of the factors ofproduction in the Furniture case, the DOCrelied on Indian import statistics to calculateestimates for their average cost to Chinese pro-ducers.It is not difficult to conceive of myriadreasons－including producer size, economiesof scale, size of purchases, mix of purchases,import sources, and so on－why such estimateswould be significantly unrepresentative of anindividual Chinese company’s costs. Further-more,in most NME cases, the surrogate’simport statistics do not comport precisely tothe description of the NME input. They areoften overly broad or too specific.
In the Furniture case, with respect to valuingcardboard, a respondent proposed using HTScategory 4808.90.00, which covers imports of“other paper and paperboard corrugated.” Therespondent argued that the petitioner’s proposalfor this input, HTS 4808.10.00, described as“corrugated paper/paperboard whether or notperforated,” was too broad because it included“perforated” paper, which it did not use. But theDOC agreed with the petitioner’s choicebecause it covered corrugated paper, the use ofwhich was observed during verification.Although the descriptions of both HTS cate-goriescovered corrugated paper, the DOCrejected the respondent’s choice because “theDepartment did not indicate in its verificationreport . . . whether Dorbest used perforated ornon-perforated cardboard.”10 Thus, the DOC’ssurrogate choice was too broad, and probablyexaggerated the input value since perforatingrepresents a cost that the respondent companydid not incur.
With respect to hooks, connectors, andhinges, the respondent argued for use of animport classification category that describedthese inputs as “made of iron,” disagreeing withthe petitioner’s choice for a category thatincluded “hinges of brass” because the respon-dent’shooks were made of iron, not brass. TheDOC departed from both choices, explainingthat the respondent’s selection was no longer avalid HTS category, selecting a category thatcovered hinges made of different types ofmetal, since the respondent did not specify thetype of metal used in its hinges. For hooks andconnectors, the DOC opted for a categorydescribed as covering “mountings, fittings andsimilar articles” that are “suitable for furniture.”The same argumentation and adjudicationprocess continued for many other input valua-tions,often leading to the selection of importclassifications that did not correspond precise-ly,or even reasonably closely, to the inputdescriptions.
To obtain financial data to complete the sell-ingexpense and profit rate components of thebenchmark, the DOC took a straight average ofthe ratios of nine Indian furniture producers. Inthis process, it excluded the profit figures fromone such company because it showed no prof-its－a practice that increased the overall profitrate. And using a straight average, as opposed toa production-based weighted average, the finan-cialexperience of smaller producers (which areusually higher-cost producers) was given equalweight.
The DOC’s practice of selectively excludingcompanies with zero or negative profit from justthe profit calculation, and then straight-averagingthe sample companies’ results, causes an inflationof the normal value benchmark in most cases. Butto harp on these particular shortcomings in amethodology that is wrought with inequitieswould give the perception that a few tweaks couldremedy the whole regime. That would be a colos-salunderstatement of the problem.
Prior to the selection of surrogate values, theselection of surrogate country is often determi-nativeof the outcome. As with selection of sur-rogatevalues, the DOC has considerable lee-wayin deciding which surrogate country to useand is guided by general rules in its decision.The statute requires that the country selectedbe, to the extent possible, at a stage of econom-icdevelopment comparable to the NME coun-try and a significant producer of comparablemerchandise. But the surrogate does not haveto be at a stage of economic development thatis most comparable to the NME country, nordo the producers in that country have to pro-ducethe most comparable merchandise. TheDOC has ample latitude in selecting the surro-gate.
Beyond the selection of surrogate countryand surrogate values, the process is further cor-ruptedby the availability of alternative sources ofdata purporting to represent the same values.Often, those values are very different because ofslightly diverging commodity descriptions, dif-ferentvaluation methods at the border, or differ-enttime periods represented by the data. Butagain, the DOC ultimately decides which dataseries to use.
The confluence of decisions regarding sur-rogatecountry, surrogate values, data reliability,selection of company financial statements, andmany more discretionary issues necessarily pre-cludesthe calculation of an “accurate” dumpingmargin. How can a figure based on the sum ofdozens or hundreds of estimates－each havingits own limitations by virtue of being over-inclusive,under-inclusive, or otherwise unrep-resentative－be regarded as accurate? Theanswer is that it cannot. Slight deviations fromany of these decisions can lead to dramaticallydifferent results. Furthermore, this methodolo-gycarries the unavoidable consequences ofbeing administratively burdensome and hugelyexpensive to respondents, petitioners, and theU.S. government.
At best, the process is capable of generatingrandom results. But the fact that NMEmethodology produces consistently higherdumping margins than those obtained pur-suantto market economy methodology sug-geststhat the DOC exercises its discretion in amanner that is often adverse to respondents.11There has to be a better way.
The principal difference between marketeconomy and NME cases is that in the former,the results are at least marginally reflective ofthe actual sales and cost experiences of the for-eignrespondent companies. But there are con-siderabledifferences too with respect to thedetermination of antidumping rates for thosecompanies not specifically investigated.
The Hierarchy of NME Duty Rate Assignments
In NME investigations, exporters are assigned one of three types of antidumping duty rates: “individual,” “Section A,” or “countrywide.” Individual rates are reserved exclusively for companies selected by the DOC to be mandatory respondents. These companies 12are relatively fortunate in that they are among the few given the opportunity to defend themselves individually. Mandatory respondents that demonstrate an absence of government control over their export operations are entitled to an individual antidumping rate, which is based on the information provided in their own questionnaire responses.
Exporters not selected as mandatory respondents are entitled to demonstrate that they too are free from government control over their export activities. These companies are required to submit responses to Section A of the DOC’s questionnaire (which seeks general information about the producers and their operations) and to submit a request for “separate rates” treatment. If they demonstrate an absence of government control over their export operations, then they are assigned a “Section A” rate, which is equal to the weighted-average of the rates calculated for them andatory respondents, excluding those rates that are zero, de minimus 13 , or based entirely on “facts available.”14 Companies that fail to demonstrate such freedom and those that do not respond fully to DOC’s information requests are assigned the “countrywide” rate ,which is usually the higher of the highest rate calculated for the mandatory respondents or the dumping margin alleged in the petition.
Even though NME cases feature the use of surrogate values as proxies for home market price, the individual rates calculated for mandatory respondents can differ because of different selling prices in the U.S. market and because of different production processes or input supply chains. An NME company that produces all of its inputs will have surrogate values assigned to those components, while accompany that imports some of its components from a market economy may have the acquisition cost used for those components.15
To appreciate how severely this process runs contrary to traditional conceptions of due process ,consider the Furniture case. The petition in that case featured allegations of dumping by a single Chinese company. The DOC issued questionnaires to seven mandatory respondents, six of which qualified for their own individual rates. Additionally, it determined that 112 of the companies applying for a Section A rate (the weighted-average rate) demonstrated an absence of government control and qualified for that rate. All the rest were assigned a prohibitive rate, culled straight from the petition, of 198.08 percent.
In a brief filed with the DOC, the petitioner in the furniture case acknowledged that the Chinese industry likely comprises 30,000 to300,000 producers of subject merchandise.16Thus, a petition launched on the basis of allegations that one single Chinese company was dumping sufficed to ensnare an entire country of exporters and prospective exporters, the overwhelming number of which were not entitled to a full investigation of their data, with a prohibitive, countrywide, guilt-by-association rate. Thus, the corollary to the fact that NME methodology is unrepresentative is that its treatment of uninvestigated companies is patently unfair.
In market economy cases, uninvestigated companies are assigned the weighted-average rate of the investigated companies automatically. The only companies potentially subject to receiving the antidumping rate alleged in the petition－something referred to as an “adverse facts available” rate－are those that are given the opportunity to present their data and make their cases, but are found, ultimately, to be uncooperative.
In NME cases, uninvestigated companies must demonstrate entitlement to the weighted-average rate. Thus, they are required to expend resources simply to qualify for the average rate－or more precisely to avoid the puni-6tive countrywide rate－even if a full review of their data would exonerate them entirely and even though companies in market economy cases automatically qualify. Instead, NME companies that are not individually investigator that do not qualify for the average rate are automatically assigned an adverse facts available rate. In the Furniture case, the weighted-average rate was 6.65 percent, while the adverse facts available-based countrywide rate was198.08 percent. There are likely thousands of prospective exporters who were assigned this adverse rate－an outcome that puts the U.S. market out of reach to many of them indefinitely.
Recently, the Chinese government submitted comments to the DOC pointing out that the adverse facts available rates, which serve as the countrywide rate in NME cases, are often prohibitive. The submission indicates that“ Chinese country-wide rates have exceeded100 percent advalorem in one-half of AD cases initiated against Chinese imports since1995, with an average rate of 112.85 percent.”17It contrasts this figure to the “all others” rate calculated in market economy cases and finds it to be 3? times greater than the 32.03 percent average prevailing in those cases. These distinctions are even more pronounced in certain cases where China and at least one market economy country were targeted.
China and Malaysia were the targets of are cent case involving Color Television Receivers. The countrywide rate for uninvestigated Chinese companies that did not qualify for the Section A rate was 78.45 percent, while the rate for uninvestigated Malaysian firms was0.75 percent. In a case involving Collated Roofing Nails, Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese exporters were investigated. The countrywide rate for China was 118.41 percent, while the average all-others rate for Korea and Taiwan was 2.68 percent. In Structural Steel Beams, the countrywide rate for China was 89.17 percent, but the average all-others rate was only 6.14percent for the exporters in six market economies.
The Chinese submission also compares countrywide and Section A rates from the same cases and finds the 112.85 percent average of the former to be two and a half times higher than the 44.15 percent average of the latter. That average difference is far less acute than the differences observed in the Furniture case, where the countrywide rate was nearly 30 times greater than the Section A rate. But several recent cases show a wide divergence in these rates. In Malleable Iron Pipe Fittings, the countrywide rate was 111.36 percent, 10 times higher than the Section A rate of 11.18 percent; in Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields, the countrywide rate was 124.5 percent, 13 times higher than the Section A rate of 9.84 percent; in Polyvinyl Alcohol, the countrywide rate was97.86, 15 times higher than the Section A rate of 6.91.
From Bad to Worse
The persistent and extreme divergence between the Section A rate and the country-wide rate in NME cases underscores the incentive of Chinese exporters to qualify for the former. Since the DOC’s selection of mandatory respondents is so limited as to preclude most companies from defending themselves properly, the only hope against being shut out of the U.S. market completely is to obtain a Section A rate. But despite the expected inaccuracies inherent in NME methodology generally, and the obvious unfairness of penalizing exporters with countrywide rates based on adverse facts available, the DOC is considering changes to its policies that could make it more difficult for Chinese－and other NME exporters－to obtain the Section A rate.
In May 2004 the DOC issued a Federal Register notice seeking comments on the consideration it was giving to changing its “separate rates” practice. Citing the administrative burden it endures under current rules, and hinting that it has perhaps been too liberal in its allowance of the Section A rate, the DOC submitted that it “has received increasing numbers of requests for separate rates from section A respondents in recent years and is facing an exceptionally large number of such requests in two ongoing investigations [Furniture and Shrimp].” In that notice, the DOC cites the concern that it “lacks the resources to evaluate the typically large number of section A respondents which request a separate rate,”and that “current implementation of the separate rates test may not offer the most effective means of determining whether exporters act, de facto, independently of the government in their export activities.”
The DOC’s request for comments suggests it hopes to reduce significantly the number of companies qualifying for the Section A rate. But such a policy change would be unnecessary, unjustifiable, unfair, and unduly provocative.
If the DOC is really concerned about its enormous administrative burden processing applications and determining qualifications for the growing number of companies seeking Section A status, it should simply reverse the burden of proof. Rather than consider all companies subject to government control and require proof to the contrary as qualification, it should assume all companies are free from control and give petitioners the opportunity to pro-vide evidence to the contrary. Companies that petitioners believe are subject to control and for which credible evidence in support of that premise is provided can then be scrutinized by the DOC. Clearly the number of Section A questionnaires－and the number of administrative review requests from Chinese companies seeking to extricate themselves from the countrywide rate－would decline significantly, easing the DOC’s administrative burden.
The evidence accumulated during the 13- year course of this separate rates policy indicates that most companies that apply for the Section A rate do in fact demonstrate an absence of government control, and qualify for that rate. An analysis of final DOC antidumping decisions between July 1995 and May 2004 reveals that 439 of 442 Chinese companies, representing approximately 50 industries, successfully demonstrated an absence of government control and received an individual or Section A rate. Thus, it would not be a radical departure, but a natural evolution of policy for the DOC to reverse the burden of proof.
The chief motivation for nonmandatory respondent companies to seek the Section A rate is that the countrywide rate, based on adverse facts available, is almost always prohibitively high. But companies that are not mandatory respondents in market economy cases automatically qualify for the all-others rate, which is an average calculated just like the Section A rate. Thus, the DOC is not overburdened with requests to qualify for the average in these cases. To complain about the administrative burden caused by its separate rates practice, the DOC should have a legitimate justification for its continuation. But when company after company, in industry after industry, in investigation after investigation can demonstrate an absence of government control, there is a rather strong argument that the separate rates practice is unnecessary, punitive, and should be abandoned by reversing the burden of proof.
Unfortunately, it appears such logic is unappealing to the DOC. On December 28, 2004, the DOC announced in the Federal Register its decision to change its separate rates practice by requiring nonmandatory NME respondents to demonstrate entitlement to the average rate through an application process. While it is unclear at this point whether the application process will be more burdensome than the pre-sent requirement of responding to Section A of the DOC’s antidumping questionnaire, one of the express purposes of the change is to raise the threshold of eligibility. Attached to the notice is a “Draft Application,” which the DOC is proposing to use. According to its description, “the draft application was designed to take into account concerns that the separate rates test could be improved to be a better measure of the export independence of firms.” Considering the success Chinese companies have had demonstrating an absence of government control over their export activities, a “better measure” can only mean a threshold that is more difficult to meet.
Senseless Provocation
Under U.S. law, an antidumping measure is supposed to be remedial, not punitive. The application of antidumping rates based on adverse facts available to companies that have not demonstrated that they warrant such treatment can only be considered punitive. The WTO Antidumping Agreement (ADA), which specifies limits on the actions member countries can take to redress dumping, states that rates of duty calculated for noninvestigated companies cannot be based in whole, or in part, on adverse facts available.
Notwithstanding the special circumstances of China’s WTO accession, which give WTO members license to deviate from the ADA in certain respects, the DOC’s current separate rates practice contravenes the ADA’s express prohibition of assigning rates based on adverse facts available to uninvestigated companies. Subjecting more Chinese exporters to this questionable practice would be needlessly provocative.
In its comments to the DOC, the Chinese government noted, “Implicit in China’s concession to allow WTO members, including the United States, to continue calculating ADD margins on an alternative basis for no more than 15 years was the understanding that a WTO member would not unilaterally modify its existing ADD margin calculation methodology, and effectively calculate margins for all Chinese companies－with the exception of a select few－on a more adverse basis than it had in the past.”The submission suggested that any decision to make qualification for separate rates status more difficult would amount to a nullification of China’s benefits as a WTO member, and could inspire China to “exercise its right under Article XXIII, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [i.e., to seek WTO dispute resolution].”
In addition to the possibility of WTO dispute settlement, there is the specter of Chinese retribution. In its June 1 submission to the DOC, the Chinese government “suggests” that the DOC should be mindful of the goal of further facilitating the development of the bilater-al economic and trade relationship. Its comments include a reminder that China “has paid very close attention to the issue of protection of intellectual property rights, which is a matter of concern to the U.S.” It then implies a parallel between U.S. antidumping administration and China’s commitment to intellectual property rights enforcement. “In light of the vast commitment of manpower resources by China necessary to control this agreed upon problem, China does not understand how the U.S. can attempt to justify a change in practice on eligibility for separate rate status for Chinese exporters involved in antidumping proceedings based solely on the DOC’s claimed shortage of manpower and a large workload.”
The document also highlights other efforts by China to further develop a healthy bilateral relationship, such as the “many delegations”28 that China has sent to the United States to purchase goods and services. It also suggests that the “United States should consider the impact of any policy change on its exportoriented industries,” reminding the DOC that China has an antidumping law, too. While some may be inclined to write off these comments as unrelated threats, such comments remind the DOC－and, indeed, U.S. policy-makers－ that trade policy is a package deal. And in the present case, U.S. antidumping policy runs the distinct risk of undermining the administration’s broader goals of encouraging China to continue liberalizing its own market.
Conclusion
U.S. antidumping policy toward China is anachronistic, unfair, and inconsistent with the Bush administ ration’s objective of making progress with China on issues that really matter. U.S. antidumping abuse is a matter over which China is growing increasingly agitated, yet the DOC is considering changes that would make bad policy worse. Failure to abandon such considerations, if not reverse course entirely, would be needlessly provocative and would undermine the administration’s ability to encourage China to do better in other, more important areas, like intellectual property rights enforcement and services liberalization.
While many bemoan the U.S. trade deficit with China－even though mutual exchange benefits parties on both sides of the transaction－ there is much less attention paid to the growing success of U.S. exporters to China. Since China’s WTO accession at the end of 2001, U.S. commodity exports to China have increased by 81 percent. By comparison, U.S. commodity exports to the rest of the world increased by only 10 percent during that time. China is a rapidly growing market from which U.S. exporters cannot afford to be excluded, yet provocative U.S. antidumping policies threaten just that.
Granting China market economy status, gradually designating its qualifying industries as “market oriented,” or simply reversing the presumption of government control would buy the United States an enormous amount of political and moral capital to encourage China to accelerate its own reforms and commit China further to the bilateral relationship. Such a change in policy would in no way undermine the ability of U.S. industries to seek and obtain antidumping duties, but it would reign in an abusiveness that squanders U.S. trade leadership. The antidumping law is effective enough at squelching imports－even with-out resort to NME methodology. Thus, liberalizing antidumping practice toward China would be a costless investment in the future.
The Bush administration deserves general-ly high marks for its handling of the trade relationship with China. It should move now to remedy the serious blot on its record that antidumping policy represents.
作者：yingsu 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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 分享] -- yingsu - (34946 Byte) 2006-5-14 周日, 04:23 (598 reads)
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